In the first 13 months of President Donald Trump's second term, the number of local law enforcement agencies trained and deputized to make federal immigration arrests has jumped from 135 to 1,168, a 950% increase, according to a new analysis of ICE data by the nonpartisan group FWD.US.

The Trump administration has aggressively revived the 287(g) program, turning street-level officers into temporary ICE agents while they continue their regular duties. Some departments have pushed back: Dallas police rejected the idea outright, and police leaders in Montgomery County, Maryland, publicly declared they will not enforce civil immigration orders. Yet in Louisiana, Republican Gov. Jeff Landry issued an executive order directing state agencies to assist federal immigration operations and encouraging local departments to sign on.

While the political fight rages, a quieter but far more expensive risk is emerging for the officers and agencies that do cooperate: Section 1983 liability.

Why Federal Agents Are Almost Untouchable—But Local Officers Are Not

Under the Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA), ICE agents enjoy strong protections. There is no fee-shifting statute, so even if a plaintiff wins, their lawyer usually cannot recover fees. The discretionary-function exception and low damage caps make most moderate-injury cases economically unviable. As a University of South Dakota law professor recently explained, the result is “practical immunity” for ICE: officers can shove bystanders, break into homes, or use questionable force without realistic fear of being sued.

State and local officers operate under a very different rulebook.

Section 1983 allows individuals to sue “persons” acting “under color of state law” for violations of federal constitutional rights. Successful plaintiffs can recover attorney's fees from the government or the officer's employer, making even modest-damages cases attractive to lawyers. Qualified immunity still exists, but it is far easier to overcome when officers are accused of excessive force, unlawful detention, or racial profiling.

The Conspiracy / Joint-Action Trap

Here is the trap: when local officers are deputized under 287(g) and actively assist ICE, by providing intelligence, making stops, or participating in raids, they can be held liable under Section 1983 even if the excessive force is committed by federal agents.

Courts have long recognized “derivative liability” and conspiracy theories in these hybrid operations. If a local department knows (or should know) that ICE is engaging in widespread Fourth or Fifth Amendment violations and still chooses to partner, plaintiffs' lawyers can argue the locals “conspired” or acted jointly. The 287(g) agreement itself becomes powerful evidence of state action.

Recent Example: The Alex Pretti Case

The death of Alex Pretti in Minnesota has become a flashpoint. Video showed Pretti pepper-sprayed, pummeled while on the ground, and then shot. ICE defended the agents' actions as “according to their training.” Public reaction was swift: a poll taken days later found 60% of respondents disapproved of the Trump administration's immigration enforcement tactics.

So far the criticism has targeted federal officers. But as more local departments sign 287(g) agreements, that focus is expected to shift. FWD.US vice president Felicity Rose warned: “I suspect we will start to hear more of those stories.” When local officers are embedded with ICE teams, any excessive-force incident can quickly become a Section 1983 case against the local department, the individual officers, and the city or county that employs them.

What the Future Holds

With 1,168 agencies now participating and the administration pushing for even more, the volume of potential incidents is rising dramatically. Every traffic stop, every raid, every detention that turns violent creates a new litigation risk for the local agency.

Fiscal conservatives and police chiefs alike are beginning to calculate the exposure. Defense costs, settlements, and adverse judgments come out of local budgets. Insurance carriers are already signaling higher premiums for departments that enter 287(g) agreements. Some agencies may decide the financial and political risk outweighs the federal reimbursement.

Meanwhile, civil-rights organizations are preparing test cases. The combination of documented ICE tactics, public video evidence, and the clear legal pathway under Section 1983 makes these lawsuits unusually plaintiff-friendly compared with pure federal actions.

Bottom Line for State and Local Leaders

Signing a 287(g) agreement no longer just means helping with deportations. It means stepping into the shoes of a state actor who can be sued (and whose employer can be ordered to pay the plaintiff's lawyers) when constitutional lines are crossed. In an era of surging immigration enforcement and widespread smartphone video, that is a high-stakes decision.

Departments that have so far stayed out, Dallas, Montgomery County, and others, are watching closely. Those that have joined are now operating in a new legal environment where federal immunity does not travel with the badge. The next excessive-force incident involving a deputized local officer could turn a single tragic arrest into a multimillion-dollar verdict against a city or county that thought it was simply “supporting federal law.”